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tion of the standard while the court questioned the
reliability of the standard of the average American
parent as a valid means of rating a film's content.
The court's critique was not the first analysis of the
MPAA's rating system. A large number of movie
makers and film critics had been strongly opposed
to the "censorship quality" of the MPAA's rating
system for years prior to the case. Specifically,
movie makers opposed the MPAA's 'X" rating be-
cause it stigmatized a film as pornographic, and it
had serious negative economic impacts. However,
the court's decision in Miramax, though legally
favoring the MPAA, was the catalyst for a substan-
tial change in the rating system. In September of
1990, just two months after Miramax, the MPAA
announced that the '"X movie rating was to be
abolished and replaced with a new category called
"NC-17" in an effort to reform its rating system. 9
Additionally, the MPAA has received a trademark
for the new rating, thus allowing only films rated
by the MPAA's system to receive it. Where the adult
movie industry previously had been able to use the
' ' rating to promote pornographic films, the new
rating will be used solely by the MPAA.
In summary, the change by MPAA to its rating
system addressed a fundamental issue that was
being neglected up until the Miramax litigation;
was the system employed by the Rating Board
satisfying the real underlying intent of rating
films? In a statement made to a writer of the Wash-
ington Post, the MPAA said, "We have con-
cluded that over the years some people have
come to endow the "X" film rating with meaning
it does not have, never has had, and was not
intended by founders of the rating program."20
The significance of Miramax lies not in its con-
clusions of law, but in its demonstration of the
court's influence, through judicial reasoning, in
affecting institutional changes in important
areas of public concern. Q2
E. Brooke Ward
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The Soc'y of Jesus of New
England v. Boston
Landmarks Comm'n,
409 Mass. 38, 564 N.E.2d 571 (1990).
Introduction
The Boston Landmarks Commission (the "Commis-
sion' designated elements of the interior of a
church' as a landmark. This church belongs to The
Society of Jesus of New England (the "Jesuits),
which challenged the designation and sought sum-
mary judgment.2 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts upheld summary judgment for the
Jesuits on the ground that the designation of the
church interior violated Article 2 of the Declaration
of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.
3
Facts
The Church of the Immaculate Conception has a
classic mid-nineteenth century church design. In
1986, the Jesuits established a plan to renovate the
church because of sparse attendance, the immense
structure of the building, and the age of the build-
ing. The renovation plan called for restructuring of
the main church into office, counseling, and resi-
dential space. After construction began, ten Boston
voters petitioned the Commission to designate the
interior of the church as a landmark under "An Act
Establishing the Boston Landmarks Commis-
sion."4
The Commission approved landmark designation
for portions of the church's interior in May, 1987.5
Under the landmark statute, the Jesuits had to
obtain approval by the Commission before renovat-
ing the portion of the church which was designated
as a landmark.6 The Jesuits challenged this desig-
nation in the Superior Court and sought to have the
designation set aside on constitutional grounds.
The Superior Court ultimately held that the land-
mark designation did violate the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution and granted summary judgment to
the Jesuits.7
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Legal Analysis
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts addressed whether the designation vio-
lated Article 2 of the Massachusetts Constitution.
In finding that it did, the Court quoted the Section
of Article 2 that provides: "[N]o subject shall be
hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty,
or estate, for worshipping GOD in the manner and
season most agreeable to the dictates of his own
conscience; or for his religious profession or senti-
ments; provided he doth not disturb the public
peace, or obstruct others in their religious wor-
ship."8
The Court stated that, according to the Massachu-
setts Constitution, there are two exclusive excep-
tions to freedom of religious belief and practice.
First, the government may interfere when the pub-
lic peace is disturbed. Second, the government can
intervene in the event the religious worship of
others is obstructed. In the case at hand, the Court
asserted that neither of the two exceptions were
met.
The Court disagreed with the Commission's argu-
ment thatthe design and placement of the altar is
merely a secular question of interior decoration and
pointed out the great significance of the location
and positioning of the altar to the Jesuits' religious
practices. The Court also stated that the configura-
tion of the church interior is filled with religious
meaning. Therefore, it must be considered part of
the Jesuits' religious worship.
Conclusion
The significant debate over the constitutionality of
applying historic preservation laws to churches
continues.9 The courts seem to have difficulty in
formulating broad rules that could apply in every
case involving church-owned property.10 Perusal of
case law suggests that this difficulty arises from the
difference between decisions based on state versus
federal constitutions. There is a need for courts to
declare general principles for the application of
historic preservation regulations to church prop-
erty.
The opinion in The Society of Jesus of New England
v. Boston Landmarks Commn is limited because it
pertains solely to the interior of the church. Any
governmental interference with the interior is
much more intrusive than is interference with the
exterior, since the former is the actual worship
space. The Court emphasized that it did not reach
the issue regarding the designation of a church's
exterior or of a church as a whole. On the contrary,
the Opinion of the Justices to the Senate stated
that a statute which required government approval
before renovating certain building exteriors's was
constitutional even as applied to religious build-
ings. 3
In summary, since historical preservation law is
still in formative stages, it is somewhat under-
standable that courts have difficulty in determin-
ing which test to apply to resolve the constitutional
issues. The Society of Jesus court applied a strict
scrutiny test.1 4 However, some courts use analyses
less demanding than strict scrutiny, such as the
rational basis test. The problem with a rational
basis test is that it requires no proof that the rule
actually furthers the state's interest. Therefore,
future problems may continue to arise because the
rational basis test fails to provide the high degree
of protection from governmental interference
which an individual's constitutional right to the
free exercise of religion deserves. 92
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